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ABSTRACT
Displacement or Diffusion: A Secondary Analysis
Of the Las Vegas Safe Village Initiative
By
Daniel D. Swanson
Dr. William H. Sousa, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice
University of Nevada Las Vegas
Police initiatives have been implemented by many agencies in an attempt to
curtail growing crime rates. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department implemented
the “Safe Village Initiative” to address this issue in west Las Vegas. This deterrence
based model reduced calls for service in the target area with a diffusion of benefits to the
surrounding neighborhoods.
The current study will analyze two research questions pertaining to the “Safe
Village Initiative”. The first will assess the possibility that a displacement of crime
occurred as a result of the treatment. The second research question will address whether,
if no displacement occurred, there was an unintended diffusion of crime benefit to the
surrounding neighborhoods. Data were obtained from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department and were analyzed for assessment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Growing gang activity, coupled with the ease of attaining legal handguns, has
attracted many young people into a life of violence. Police agencies, and their
accompanying reactive response to these occurrences, continued to watch as
victimization continued. Despite the fact that crime has been declining in recent years, it
remains a persistent problem for police agencies. The police therefore should engage in
proactive initiatives to make sure that the crime rate continues to go down. New
strategies were developed to address these issues. Police initiatives were implemented
across the country in an effort to deter crime, rather than wait for it to happen. The idea
was to implement a proactive approach to policing, focusing on a goal of reducing callsfor- service. Deterrence style approaches had been used by police agencies for over a
century and the majority of agencies incorporated some form of strategy aimed at
proactive measures. Most notable was the New York “Quality of Life” initiative, which
was implemented based on its accompanying claim of crime reduction (Kelling & Sousa,
2001).
One such initiative has taken place in Las Vegas Nevada called, “The Safe
Village Initiative” (SVI). The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department developed a
strategy involving community leaders and rehabilitated gang members. The goal was to
educate possible offenders at critical times during crises events. The strategy, utilizing
heightened enforcement, resulted in a reduction in calls-for-service in the targeted area.
This collaborative approach met the needs of this community at a time when violent
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crimes were on the rise and policy makers understood that the days of being reactive
were over. An aggressive approach was necessary and the results seemed promising.
Despite the success of such programs like SVI, one potential complication
involves displacement. Displacement is the idea that when employing rigorous police
strategies in a confined area, offenders relocate or change modus operandi to avoid
attention. This is often in close proximity to the target area or just out of reach of the
treatment. Opponents of initiatives argue that time and efforts are wasted with no real
reduction in criminal behavior. The belief is that calls-for-service continue to pour into
dispatch centers, only around the corner from their previous locations. A false reduction
in crime is correlated to the treatment in the target area at the cost of increasing Calls-forService in surrounding neighborhoods. This is considered spatial displacement or
geographical displacement, (Clarke & Eck, 2003).
In opposition to the above, (Clarke & Weisburd, 1994), find that crime is reduced
in accompanying areas of concentration creating the phenomenon of “diffusion.”
Diffusion is the unintended consequence of decreasing crime in surrounding areas to the
treatment, based on the implementation of proactive policing in a target area. It appears
to proponents of initiatives that a ripple effect occurs to adjoining neighborhoods.
Dispersion of offenders away from the target dilutes the actors across all geographic
borders.
The purpose of this study is to address the issues of displacement and diffusion.
This paper re-examines the SVI initiative and corresponding statistical data. The first
part discusses SVI in more detail followed by the methods used to examine them. A
closer look will allow for further scrutiny on a much politicized topic.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Police departments transitioned away from the reactive approach and into a
proactive mode decades ago (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Starting in the 1980’s, most police
agencies began to place stronger emphasis on proactive policies. Agencies realized the
urgency for officers to identify and isolate offenders before serious crime occurred. The
idea was to focus police resources on more specific targets. The goal was to reduce or
dilute the offender pool by managing minor offenses.
One example of proactive policing is NYPD’s “Order Maintenance Policing”,
based on the “Broken Windows” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) philosophy. Under the
Bratton administration, a great deal of focus and attention was given to areas within the
city that were considered disorderly and plagued with escalating crime rates. The idea
was to manage minor offenses, thus limiting opportunities for more serious crimes
(Skogan, 1990).
A new style of policing arose out of this heightened enforcement. It involved the
community and peer role models. In an attempt to reduce crimes in neighborhoods,
closer scrutiny by the police demanded a partnership with those in the community driven
by the desire to take back ownership from criminals. These police-citizen contacts
reduced crime (Kelling & Moore, 1988). This partnership allowed respected community
leaders to have direct access to the police department in return for highly needed
intelligence on crimes and criminals in these areas.
This partnership flourished and crime trended downward as a result. This new
relationship allowed information to be traded and a more efficient targeting of behavior
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was initiated. The totality of information regarding both the offender and the
characteristics leading to the victim, allowed for a more appropriate response to the issue
at hand (Goldstein, 1990). The progression of the community role in policing led to a
two-pronged approach targeting violent behavior. This “pulling levers” strategy
(Weisburd & Braga, 2006) involved heightened police scrutiny coupled with community
working groups reaching out to the targeted audience. The community leaders would
strengthen and reinforce the clear and expected standard for behavior. This idea drove
the engine on many police departments’ proactive initiatives. Proactive strategies were
developed to address the growing crime rates and initiatives were implemented. The
initiatives that follow produced positive results with reductions in violent crimes along
with incorporating the assistance of the community. As a result of the initiatives, many
researchers began to ask questions of unintended consequences. Did the proactive
approach only move the crime offenders to new locations creating displacement, or was
there a diffusion of crime benefits associated to the initiative?
Initiatives
The “pulling levers” intervention strategy began to evolve during the 1990s. A
key element to “pulling levers” is the delivery of a message from community leaders, in
an effort to deter possible violators. These community leaders target the audience and
warn them of possible consequences based on their actions (Braga, 2005). This idea
spread rapidly across the country with cities implementing the tactics in an effort to
address the escalating crime problem. One notable initiative implemented in Boston
Massachusetts coined, “Operation Cease Fire”, gained notoriety. Richmond Virginia
followed suit with a “pulling levers” tactic that was similar called “Project Exile”.
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Chicago and Los Angeles continued this template with an “Operation Ceasefire” and Las
Vegas, Nevada with “Safe Village Initiative”.
Operation Ceasefire
The city of Boston Massachusetts in the 1990’s, initiated a response to the
growing youth homicide rate. Gang activity continued to recruit young violators at an
alarming rate. The focus was placed on the illegal firearms and the ability for minors to
attain them. A collaboration of multiple agencies gathered to create a task force that
involved the federal, state and local agencies. The goal focused on long term results
based on intervention techniques used to persuade gang members away from their
activity (Braga et al., 2000). This task force consisted of the Boston Police Department,
the Massachusetts Department of Probation and Parole, Office of the Suffolk County
District Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Boston School Police, and a
whole host of social service gang outreach members attached to the Boston community
centers.
“Operation Cease Fire” began with the implementation of two main components.
The first was a law enforcement saturation targeting illicit firearms and the traffickers
supplying the minors with guns. The second was a mass public message warning any
potential violators of the consequences of their actions. This was a deterrent approach to
combat the gang violence in the city (Braga et al., 2000).
Operation Cease Fire began in January of 1995. One year later in 1996, the
Boston youth homicide rate had declined from 44 in 1995 to 26 in 1996. The rate
continued to drop in 1997 an additional 15 (Braga et al., 2000). A post time frame of
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June 1, 1996 showed a 63% reduction in the mean monthly number of youth homicide
victims from a pre-test mean of 3.5 per month, to a 1.3 per month post test (Braga et al.,
2000). This program appeared to exceed the goals set forth in the implementation.
Project Exile
Richmond Virginia was experiencing many of the same crime problems as did
Boston. It was considered one of the top five cities in the United States for murder rates.
In 1997, the murder rate was 144 with the majority using a firearm in the commission of
the crime. Expanding on the ideas used in the Boston initiative, the United States
Attorney’s office in Richmond created “Project Exile”. The focus of project exile was
heightened police enforcement directed at ex-felons and their use of firearms in the
commission of crimes. If a suspect was charged, the complaint would then be federally
prosecuted with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms and local authorities. The goal was to execute a swift and severe
penalty on violators that had previously been ignored in the state court system. A media
campaign was then waged, warning all potential offenders of the high probability of
facing federal sanctions for their actions (McGarrell, 2005).
The post test results showed a large decrease in violent crimes. According to the
United States Attorney Office for the Eastern District of Virginia (1999), 287 criminals
were arrested during this initiative. The rate of felons using firearms was cut in half,
giving police managers a positive template for future initiatives.
Los Angeles Cease Fire
The gang violence was not exclusive to the east coast. The city of Los Angeles
was experiencing an alarming escalation of violence by youth gangs, and their past
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efforts to thwart the actions seemed futile. The post results of the Boston model showed
promising results and it was quickly used as a template to begin proactive policing aimed
at youth gang violence. Los Angeles adopted the heightened media message of
deterrence, but attached a menu of “sticks” and “carrots” to the initiative. The idea of
“sticks” was to warm violators of the consequences facing the gang members if they
proceeded to commit violent infractions. The “carrots” were the prevention component
aimed at showing the youth an alternative lifestyle. It was believed that this early
intervention by community leaders would persuade them away from street crime and the
possible incarceration into the state prison system. The Los Angeles Police Department
saturated the Boyle Heights area that consisted of its highest crime areas. Targeted areas
showed an overall 37% reduction compared to 24% in the remainder of the Boyle
Heights areas. The treatment showed significant positive effects.
Safe Village Initiative
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in February of 2007,
implemented one such proactive police strategy. This initiative, which is the focus of this
current study, was labeled, “Safe Village”. It was focused in west Las Vegas in a high
density neighborhood known for a large number of violent crimes. The year prior to the
initiative resulted in 283 illegal shootings and 139 calls-for-service involving a person
with a gun. The initiative involved collaboration from many social networks combined
with law enforcement agencies. The Safe Village Initiative involved four key components
or teams which were directed by a leader in each. The response component involved a
former gang member turned pastor that had direct ties to the community. He would
respond to violent events within 72 hours and demonstrate his outrage towards the
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occurrence and preach the need to refrain from retaliation. The outreach component
involved a Clark County gang specialist that acted as a mentor developing a trust with
members of the community. The trauma team acted as the bridge for intervention. They
assisted the mentor in gaining access to victims of violence and several locations that
previously were inaccessible to anyone but family and law enforcement. Sustainment
dealt with program functioning which received oversight by an employee of the city of
Las Vegas with the responsibilities of providing funding mechanisms and points of entry
for anyone needing assistance as a result of violent events.. The response is the reactive
approach where the outreach is proactive and guided by mentors. The goal was to
intervene at critical times in order to direct future actions. The initiative resulted in a
significant reduction in calls-for-service, (Radtke, 2007). Radtke found significant
correlations in violent crime reductions based on the strategies employed. The time frame
was one year prior to the treatment in February of 2006, to one year after treatment which
concluded in January of 2008.
Table 1. Safe Village Initiative Strategies

Directed Jurisdiction/
Initiative Working
Group
SVI Violence Specific Beat
Sector (We
& W6)/
Policing,
Probation
and Parole,
Community
Agencies

Enforcement Message

SVI Team
Created,
Identified &
Cracked
Down on
“Problem
Houses”
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Outreach Community
Mobilization

“Stop the Outreach
Violence” workers,
Fliers
Faith
Based
Leaders

Distribute
Antiviolence
literature,
Host events,
Response to
Violent
Events

Displacement and Diffusion
Critics of crime control initiatives often believe that a saturation of officers in
problem areas will not necessarily reduce crime. In fact, opponents often believe that the
crime is not eliminated or reduced just relocated (Sherman, 1990). This is referred to as
displacement- an “alteration of criminal activity as a consequence of preventative efforts”
(Gabor, 1981). Accordingly, offenders will attempt to circumvent the pressure placed
upon them by the heightened scrutiny. The belief is that implementing a police strategy
that only moves the crime from one location to another serves no purpose. Money and
resources are used with no clear advantage to the public.
There are five different types of displacement discussed in the literature, (Clarke
& Eck, 2003). Researchers (Hakim & Rengert, 1981) examined these five categories and
divided them into types based on specific criteria. Temporal Displacement is the process
of adjusting times to avoid capture. Certain crimes that were routinely committed in the
evening hours would be changed to the morning thus reducing scrutiny. This can also be
the result of a “postponement” of action, awaiting a more productive time frame to avoid
capture or recognition. Target displacement is switching the object of offending. This can
be as simple as selecting a new target. Many times a concentration of victimization
directed towards one class brings on unwanted attention thus resulting in a change of
desired victims. Tactical is the changing of procedures in order to adapt to the growing
pressure. This changing of methods is a learning scale for offenders who adapt their
techniques in order to be more productive and successful at flying under the radar. Most
violators of law attempt to remain hidden, but initiative policing attempts to flush them
into the open. Changing the methods of offending is a logical result in the attempt to
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avoid incarceration. The most widely recognized type of displacement is that of
geographical or spatial displacement where the offender relocates to a different area. The
remaining displacement type is crime type. This type of displacement involves the
perpetrator changing the crimes they commit based on the pressure placed on their
previous crime type. Previous studies focused on the economic system of costs and
benefits (Palmer, 1977) and the desire based on these incentives to adapt but not cease the
activity. One similar study (Vold, 1979) found that responses to pressure only deflected
rather than eliminate a particular crime pattern. As the gold rush attracted prospectors,
crime opportunities for success attract more perpetrators as noted by (Barr & Pease,
1990) who found another type labeled “perpetrator displacement.” This is the result of
enormous opportunity for offenders thus creating an influx of business opportunity for
individuals preying on victims.
Displacement is a concept frequently used by critics of opportunity-reducing
measures. The problem is the lack of empirical evidence to support such claims. When
researchers attempt to analyze spatial displacement, it is extremely difficult to say with
certainty just where the offenders relocated. Many assumptions are made lacking
empirical evidence to support such claims. Researchers have a difficult task of measuring
such occurrences based on the multitude of forms exhibited (Hakim & Rengert, 1981).
They do not argue that results in the target area produce reductions of certain crimes, only
that actors move to different locations. The belief is that spatial displacement occurs.
The overwhelming majority of research has focused on the target area and the treatment
administered, leading to wide speculation on the surrounding areas. Past researchers have
focused in on a zone or close proximity to the treatment (Green, 1996; Weisburd &

10

Green, 1995). Most metropolitan cities have a concentration of low income
developments that are huddled together in different geographical areas. Implementation
of treatment in one area that displays economic hardships might be surrounded by high
income residential areas with little in common to the treatment area. Projects or
economically depressed neighborhoods can be geographically separated by miles of
terrain resulting in the blinders being placed on researchers “looking in front of the hood
and not seeing the roadway.” There have been several criticisms about this kind of
displacement (Barr & Pease, 1990), but research is lacking with specific focus on the
displacement itself. The vast majority of displacement theory commentary has been due
to the research on data specific to the initiative itself and not directly on the displacement
or diffusion (Weisburd, 2006). Analysis of the evidence suggests that displacement is not
inevitable.
Research recently found that correlations can be drawn to a positive crime
reduction in the surrounding areas to the target treatment administered by the police
initiatives (Weisburd & Green, 1995). This “diffusion of benefits” suggests that areas
close to the treatment receive positive results in crime reduction without the heightened
police scrutiny brought on by initiative policing. Proponents of such hot spots police
strategies claim that crime is concentrated in certain locations (Sherman & Weisburd,
1995). Analysis of these hot spots reveal statistically significant mean effect size for
these targeted areas (Braga, 2005), and research suggests an overall reduction in calls for
service in these hot spots areas in comparison to the control area. This suggests an
overall reduction in calls for service based on police intervention strategies. Researchers
claim that crime reduction occurs, although unintended, and it ripples through
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neighboring locations. These strategies develop a “Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits”
that only strengthens the arguments for implantation of pro-active police strategies,
(Clarke & Weisburd, 1994). Many other scholars have noted these findings in their
research (Caeti, 1999; Hope, 1994; Weisburd & Green, 1995). Weisburd (2006)
conducted research by means of observational measures. His research involved two sites
with substantial street-level crime that were monitored during an experimental period.
Two neighboring areas were selected as “catchment areas” to assess whether
displacement or diffusion occurred. His study supported the position that the most likely
outcome of focused crime prevention efforts is a diffusion of crime control benefits.
Social observations (Park & Burgess, 1921; Reiss, 1971; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1991)
have been found to be very effective. Crimes that happen on the streets like prostitution
and drug dealing can be empirically studied and measured by observational data.
However, it is extremely expensive and time exhaustive. Most methodologies that have
used observational instruments and code books, concentrated on the target area and
corresponding initiative, rather than focusing on surrounding areas. A larger problem is
the fact that while narrowing in on the locations proximate to the treatment, researchers
can lose focus of possible displacement or diffusion effects. Predators are not limited to
borders and have the ability to be mobile. Looking to close to the initiative and treatment
area can lead a researcher to assumptions not backed up by empirical evidence.
The controversial nature of police initiatives has researchers looking for empirical
evidence to support claims of viable programs. The past research has shown the
inconsistent findings and many admit to the varying findings as Novak stated (1999):
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“there is some reason to believe these efforts by police can displace crime
to contiguous areas, or conversely, these areas can experience a diffusion
of benefits”. It is apparent that both sides of the issue are given validity
which only convolutes the issue. This research first must acknowledge
that it is extremely difficult to detect either displacement or diffusion. The
reason is the potential for diverse manifestations (Weisburd and Green,
1995b). Fear of peer review and possible scrutiny should never sway
research into critical skepticism of police initiatives and their possible
consequences. Political bias should be eliminated and valid empirical
evidence should be sought after.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
This study will examine potential displacement and diffusion from SVI. To do so,
two areas of Las Vegas will be examined to determine evidence of displacement or
diffusion. The Nora area, which includes sector beats in close proximity to the Las Vegas
Strip, as depicted in appendix I, and the areas surrounding SVI, as depicted in appendix I.
The Safe Village Initiative is concentrated in an economically depressed area, prone to
violent crime. The Safe Village Initiative is in a geographically small area, and many
residents comprise high levels of unemployment, large minority make-up and highly
visible street narcotic activity. Its location is divided by freeway traffic and largely dense
surface street activity. Its location is within walking distance of the downtown area of Las
Vegas making pedestrian traffic commonplace unlike more suburban or rural areas.
Because of this study and its concentration on the SVI target area, secondary data
have been attained from the Nora area within the Las Vegas Metropolitan Departments
sector beat locations, depicted in appendix I. The Nora area was chosen as the site to
compare statistical information based on characteristics, not on geographical proximity to
the target area. The Nora area is one of the largest calls for service areas for the LVMPD
consisting of large narcotics activity and prone to violent crime. This location is
approximately 8 miles from the Safe Village Initiative target location, making any relocation of offenders by foot unlikely. Any movement between the two locations must be
assumed to be by means of vehicle conveyance. The Nora area is prone to narcotic street
activity with high numbers of cocaine arrests which is similar to that of the target area.
Many of the street narcotics arrests in the target (William) area indicate addresses and
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previous arrest data linking many suspects to the Nora area. The Nora area is policed
without the guidance of a specific initiative, only numerous saturation points driven by
key events. There is a heightened scrutiny by patrol officers at all intersections and
developments within the area but police action is undertaken without specific guidance.
The analysis between these two areas allows for a control group (Nora) and the target
area given the treatment (William). The analysis is not a randomized control group-rather
it is chosen based on similar characteristics.
Secondary data were received from the surrounding sector beats of SVI from the
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department to analyze calls for service in regards to
significant fluctuations in the time periods both prior and post implementation of SVI.
The SVI target area involved the W5 and W6 sector beats within the Bolden Area
Command. The surrounding sector beats are W4 and U2, which are in Bolden Area
Command, along with sector beats B1, A1, A2, and C1, which are in the Downtown Area
Command. Calls for service were analyzed both pre-treatment and post-treatment.
Also, data were obtained for the entire LVMPD reporting areas, thus allowing for
the comparisons of crime trends valley wide.
Because of the enormous data set, key calls for service were used to encompass
the full analysis of violent crimes that might not have been captured in the Radtke (2006)
analysis of SVI. While violent calls for service categorized as 413-person with a gun,
413a- person with a knife, 415a assault with a gun, 420- homicide, 420z-attempted
homicide, and 434-illegal shooting, many more can be added to broaden the data base
and further the analysis. Radtke (2006) selected the above based on the violent nature of
the offense. In this current paper, calls-for- service were broadened to encompass a
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broader spectrum of possible violence related events. The following were selected and
defined as: 405-suicide, 407-robbery, 407b-robbery with other deadly weapon, 413bother deadly weapon, 415b-battery with other deadly weapon, 415c-drive by shooting,
426-sexual assault, 427-kidnap. The 405(suicide) call-for-service was added due to the
violent and common firearm assisted method involved. It is understood that passive
methods are sometimes used in this endeavor but due to the death and resulting coroners
cause of death to be undetermined for lengthy time periods, the call was involved in a
violent event needing to be added to the data. The disposition program that the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police department uses in crime analysis allows for the patrol officer to
reclassify an event in the system at the conclusion of a call to better describe the event. If
and when the event unfolds to better describe the violence directed, the officer would
reclassify and clear the event to a more specific event such as robbery or sexual assault.
These two calls are obviously violent in nature and the need to incorporate such data is
crucial to future analysis.
Secondary data was also collected using the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Departments calls-for-service involving property events. Research into this area will
attempt to draw answers to questions of crime type displacement or the changing of
violent crimes by offenders to property crimes. Using the data, calls for service were
selected due to the non-violent, property offense nature. The following calls-for-service
are defined as: 406-burglary, 411-stolen motor vehicle, 414-grand larceny, and 414a-petit
larceny.
The final data set provided by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police department was
calls-for-service in relation to pro-active, self generated activity by the patrol officer to
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analyze correlations to either reductions or increases in calls irrespective of any initiative
generated. The premise for many initiatives is the heightened influx of patrol scrutiny
towards potential offenders. The following calls-for-service are the only self generated
calls defined as: 467-vehicle stop, 468-person stop (see Table 2) highlighted.

Table 2. Result of Total calls-for-service comparison Feb06-Jan08

SVI
Surrounding Beats
Comparison Beats
Other LVMPD Beats

Violent
1622
2927
3178
45136

Property
1095
3380
4629
103645

Proactivity
3959
5814
7909
807365

A limitation to this data set is the fact that much victimization goes undetected as
a result of victims failing to notify police. Therefore, caution will be used when
interpreting analyses of violent crimes and property crimes.
Research Question: Did crime displace spatially from the treatment administered in SVI
to surrounding sector beats?
If displacement occurred as the result of SVI, the average number of calls-forservice in the W4, U2, B1, A1, A2, and C1 areas, which surround the SVI target, during
the one year implementation, will be expected to be more than the average number of
calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI implementation. The
displacement would occur proximate geographically to the SVI treatment administered.
This type of displacement would be expected based on the heightened enforcement.
Conversely, the average number of calls-for-service in the W4, U2, B1, A1, A2,
and C1 areas, which surround the SVI target, during the one year implementation, will be
17

expected to be less than the average number of calls-for-service during the one year
period prior to SVI implementation. This would be a diffusion of benefits resulting in the
action taken in the SVI area.
Research Question: Did criminals displace to an area with similar characteristics not
adjacent to the treatment area?
The average number of calls-for-service in the Nora sector beats during the one
year period prior to implementation of SVI, will be will be expected to be less than the
average number of calls-for-service one year following the SVI implementation. The past
research has focused on the spatial displacement that may occur in the close proximity to
the treatment location. However recent questions have been directed at a displacement to
another but similar location far from the initiative treatment. The Nora sector beats are in
close proximity to a large tourist source due to the Las Vegas Strip. There is a great deal
of pedestrian traffic associated with the casino industry service work force. The area
residents comprise a large minority population and high levels of unemployment. Large
numbers of arrests are made from street narcotic sales and the drug of choice is that of
cocaine. This is similar to the SVI target location. Based on the pedestrian traffic,
narcotics activity and steady flow tourist traffic, the two locations appear very similar.
Research Question: Did criminals change their crime type to avoid scrutiny?
The assumption is made that offenders when pressured by initiative treatment will
substitute their crime type to another. While pressure was placed on the treatment area to
reduce violent calls, the property crimes were increasing in frequency. Research focused
on the property crimes calls-for-service. The average number of calls-for-service
involving property crimes in the W5 and W6 areas should be greater following the one
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year implementation, than the average number of calls-for-service during the one year
period prior to SVI.
Conversely, the average number of calls-for-service involving property crimes, in
the W5 and W6 areas, during the one year implementation, will be expected to be less
than the average number of calls-for-service during the one year period prior to SVI
resulting in a diffusion of crime benefit.
Research Question: Was the crime decrease in West Las Vegas indicative of a larger
trend in the entire city?
The average number of calls-for-service in the entire LVMPD jurisdiction during
the one year prior to the SVI implementation, compared to the average number of callsfor-service one year after SVI implementation would expect to show a decline city wide.
There is a national trend of crime reduction that appears to be occurring. Many
researchers believe that undue credit is placed upon the treatment outcomes, when the
crime rate was already in a downward trend independently to the treatment administered.
Data collected from The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department were entered
into a database (SPSS) for analysis. Data were analyzed to assess significance in the
mean for calls-for-service (p < .05).
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Research Question 1
Did crime displace from the treatment administered in SVI to surrounding sector beats?
When accounting for the entire sector beats surrounding the target area of SVI,
there is a 14% reduction in violent calls-for-service during the one year after
implementation (see Table 3). The data supports the Radtke (2007) study which found a
37.06% reduction in violent calls-for-service during this time period within the SVI beats.
By broadening the data set to include 405(suicide), 407(robbery), 407b (robbery with
other deadly weapon), 411(stolen motor vehicle), 413b (other deadly weapon), 415b
(battery with other deadly weapon), 415c (drive by shooting), 426(sexual assault), and
427(kidnap) this research found a reduction of 30% concurring with the significant
findings in the Radtke research in the SVI target area. In the surrounding areas, the t-test
revealed a statistically significant difference between the pre SVI and post SVI calls-forservice (t=3.176, p=.020). Pre SVI is defined by the mean counts of the fifteen calls-forservice per month for one year prior to implementation whereas post SVI is one year
following. Table 3 shows the number of calls for service for violent crimes isolated in the
target area compared to the surrounding, Nora and remaining portions of the Las Vegas
valley.
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Table 3. Calls-for-Service for violent crimes Isolated

Feb06-Jan07
Feb07-Jan08
Total

SVI

Comparison
Beats

Surrounding
Beats

954
668
1622

1584
1594
3178

1570
1357
2927

Other
LVMPD
Beats
23639
21497
45136

Table 4 depicts the time-series and corresponding percentage change. Figure 1
shows the trend with regards to violent crimes in all areas examined. When isolating the
calls-for-service (violent) in the target areas only, the following is revealed. The t-test
revealed a statistically significant decrease of 29.98% between the pre SVI and post SVI
violent calls-for-service (t=5.157, p=.000). When isolating the violent calls-for-service
the t-test revealed a statistically significant 13.57% reduction between the pre SVI and
post SVI violent calls-for-service (t=3.176, p=.004).

Table 4. Violent Calls-for-Service: Pre-implementation to post-implementation

SVI
Surrounding
Comparison
Other
LVMPD
Beats
*Significance = p<.05

Feb06-Jan07
954
1570
1584
23639
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Feb07-Jan08
668
1357
1594
21497

Percent Change
-29.98% *
-13.57% *
+0.63%
-9.06%

Figure 1. Time Series of Violent Calls-for-Service
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Research Question 2
Did criminals displace to an area with similar characteristics not adjacent to the
treatment?
When including a comparison study area several key characteristics were chosen
to find as similar study location to that of the treatment area in SVI. When including a
comparison area, the Nora sector beats were chosen for their similar traits. Although the
area is approximately 6 miles from the treatment area, the research looked to see if spatial
displacement away from the target area occurred. Figure 1 depicts the time period of one
year following the treatment which resulted in an increase in violent calls-for-service in
the Nora areas of 0.63% which is not significant. When isolating the calls-for-service
(violent) only in the Nora areas, the following is revealed. The t-test revealed a difference
22

between the pre SVI and post SVI calls-for-service (t= -.095, p=.925) which is not
significant.
Research Question 3
Did criminals change their crime type to avoid scrutiny?
As previously stated, many proponents of displacement believe offenders when
pressured will change their crime type. The research looked at the data involving property
calls-for-service including: 406(burglary), 414(grand larceny), and 414a (petit larceny) to
analyze findings. Isolating the property calls-for-service, as depicted in Table 5, shows
the reductions in the time series from pre-implementation to post-implementation.

Table 5. Property Calls-for-Service: Pre-implementation to post-implementation

SVI
Surrounding
Comparison
Other
LVMPD
Beats
* Significance = p<.05

Feb06-Jan07
601
1709
2478
52733

Feb07-Jan08
494
1671
2151
50912

Percent Change
-17.80% *
-.22%
-13.20% *
-3.45%

During the time period of one year after the implementation of SVI, there was a
significant decrease of 17.80% in calls-for-service involving property crimes in the target
area. The surrounding sector beats to the SVI treatment also found a reduction of 2.22%
in calls-for-service property crimes, although not statistically significant. However the
comparison study location of Nora sector beats displayed a significant reduction during
this same time period of 13.20%. In the remaining areas of Las Vegas a reduction in
calls-for-service for property calls-for-service reduced 3.45%. When isolating the calls-
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for-service (property), in the target area only, the following is revealed. The t-test
revealed a statistically significant decrease between the pre SVI and post SVI calls-forservice (t=2.156, p=.042). When isolating the calls-for-service (property), in the
surrounding areas only, the following is revealed. The t-test revealed a decrease between
the pre SVI and post SVI calls-for-service (t=.546, p=.590), which is not significant.
When isolating the calls-for-service (property) in the Nora areas only, the following is
revealed. The t-test revealed a statistically significant decrease between the pre SVI and
post SVI calls-for-service (t=3.46, p=.002).

Figure 2. Time Series for Property Calls-for-Service
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Research Question 4
Did crime rates in the entire LVMPD jurisdiction decline or increase?
The entire Las Vegas area, excluding the SVI, surrounding and Comparison areas,
were researched to determine if a possible crime trend was occurring. The target area of
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SVI accounted for only 1.2% of all calls-for-service. The comparison group or Nora beats
accounted for 3.3% while the surrounding beats to the treatment accounted for 3.6% of
the calls-for-service. The remainder of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Departments
calls-for-service accounted for 91.9% as shown in Table 6 below.

Table 6. Total Frequencies of LVMPD Calls-for-Service
Frequency
32028
88392
97736
2486348

SVI
Comparison
Surrounding
Other Beats

Percent
1.2
3.3
3.6
91.9

When isolating the violent calls-for-service in the entire rest of the LVMPD
jurisdiction, the following is revealed. The t-test revealed a statistically significant
difference between the pre SVI and post SVI calls-for-service (t=2.92, p=.008). It
resulted in a decrease of 9.06% for violent calls-for-service city wide which is significant.
When isolating the property calls-for-service only, the following is revealed. The t-test
revealed a difference between the pre SVI and post SVI calls-for-service (t=1.61,
p=.121), which is not significant. Pre SVI is defined by the mean counts of the fifteen
calls-for-service per month for one year prior to implementation whereas post SVI is one
year following. Figure 3 shows the time-series results for both property and violent callsfor-service during pre-implementation and post-implementation. There was a reduction in
property calls-for-service of 3.45% which is significant.
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Figure 3. Time Series for Entire Las Vegas Valley
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Table 7 depicts the time-series and corresponding percentage change with regard
to the proactive nature of officers working the areas. It is apparent that across the
LVMPD jurisdiction, a policy of aggressive, proactive patrolling was in effect during this
time frame. Significant increases in all study areas were evident. Figure 4 displays the
increase of activity across the time series in the Las Vegas Valley compared to the target
and surrounding areas.

Table 7. Proactive Calls-for-Service: Pre-implementation to post-implementation

SVI
Surrounding
Comparison
Other LVMPD
Beats

Feb06-Jan07
1850
2707
3126
369245

Feb07-Jan08
2109
3107
4783
438120
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Percent Change
+12.28%
+12.87%
+34.64%
+15.72%

When isolating the calls-for-service (proactive) in the target areas only, the
following is revealed. The t-test revealed a difference between the pre SVI and post SVI
calls-for-service (t= -1.05, p=.306), which is not significant. When isolating the calls-forservice (proactive) in the surrounding areas only, the following is revealed. The t-test
revealed a statistically significant difference between the pre SVI and post SVI calls-forservice (t= -2.32, p=.030). When isolating the calls-for-service (proactive) in the Nora
beats only, the following is revealed. The t-test revealed a statistically significant
difference between the pre SVI and post SVI calls-for-service (t= -6.09, p=.000). When
isolating the calls-for-service (proactive) in the rest of the Las Vegas valley only, the
following is revealed. The t-test revealed a statistically significant difference between the
pre SVI and post SVI calls-for-service (t= -4.36, p=.000).

Figure 4. Time Series for Proactive Calls-for-Service

Proactive
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Feb06-Jan08
Surrounding
W4,U2,B1,A1,A2,C1

Nora

27

SVI
W5,W6

Table 8. Overall Results of Proactivity
Proactivity
SVI
Surrounding Areas
Comparison Areas
Other LVMPD
Areas

+12%
+12%
+35%
+16%

Violent Calls-forProperty Calls-for-Service
Service
-30%
-18%
-14%
-%
+.63%
-13%
-9%
-3%

Table 8 depicts the overall results based on the proactive calls-for-service of
patrol officers and the corresponding effect to both property and violent calls-for-service.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The research presented expanded on the research findings of Radtke (2007). The
Safe Village Initiative was an effective mediation that the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department used in reducing violent crimes. The significant reductions in calls-forservice have given the citizens within the target area reason to applaud its success.
Previous research findings have had conflicting results; however the research findings on
the SVI initiative itself strengthen the argument of its validity. This research expanded
the data field used by Radtke and was able to replicate the findings. The time –series
shows a 29.98% reduction in the mean monthly number of the fifteen calls-for-service
from a pre-test mean of 79.50 calls-for-service per month to a post-test mean of 55.67.
This analysis suggests that even with the expansion of calls-for-service scrutinized, SVI
was associated with a large reduction in calls for violent crimes.
Arguments of displacement tend to focus on the spatial or geographical relocation
of offenders, which clearly in Table 2 depicts the contrary. With a reduction of 13.57% in
violent calls-for-service in the surrounding areas to the treatment, it can be concluded that
no spatial displacement occurred to neighboring communities as a result of heightened
police enforcement. The time –series shows a 13.57% reduction in the mean monthly
number of the fifteen calls-for-service from a pre-test mean of 130.83 calls-for-service
per month to a post-test mean of 113.08. Crime did not move around the corner as
opponents of initiatives have surmised. In fact, it can be argued that a diffusion of
benefits occurred due the significant reduction in these areas. Spatial displacement to a
further, comparison location may have occurred. With Table 2 showing an insignificant
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0.63% increase in calls-for-service in the Nora areas, when the surrounding areas had
evidence of a reduction as well as the remainder of the LVMPD jurisdiction with a
reduction, it can be assumed that the comparison area should have sustained a reduction
as well. An increase, although insignificant, may be as a result of spatial displacement to
this location. It can conversely be stated that no effects of diffusion of benefits occurred
to this similar study location with the violent calls-for-service holding consistent during
this time period.
Displacement by means of crime type appears unlikely due to the 17.80%
reduction in property crimes, as depicted in Table 3. The time –series shows a reduction
in the mean monthly number of the four calls-for-service from a pre-test mean of 50.08
calls-for-service per month to a post-test mean of 41.17. Offenders did not seem to be
changing their crime types based on the lack of a spike or significant increase in any
property related offenses. In fact it can be assumed that a diffusion of crime benefits did
occur in the property crime reductions as well. Although 2.22% is insignificant, it shows
that the surrounding areas to the treatment did not sustain any unintended consequences
in property victimization as a result of the initiative treatment. The comparison study
area, Nora sector beats, sustained a significant decrease in calls-for-service at13.20%, for
property related crimes, which fails to correlate any empirical evidence to support any
claims of displacement. The time –series shows a reduction in the mean monthly number
of the four calls-for-service from a pre-test mean of 206.50 calls-for-service per month to
a post-test mean of 179.25. It would difficult to draw correlations towards a diffusion of
benefits, and future studies need to scrutinize possible variables for its positive effects.
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The LVMPD data did show findings that any positive effects correlated to
positive crime reductions were compounded by a Las Vegas Valley wide reduction in
both violent calls-for- service as well as property crimes. A reduction in violent calls at
9.06% occurred in the entire rest of the Las Vegas valley. The time –series shows a
reduction in the mean monthly number of the fifteen calls-for-service from a pre-test
mean of 1969.92 calls-for-service per month to a post-test mean of 1791.42. These data
shows a clear reduction in crime that appears to be happening and compounding the
effects of the SVI initiative. Property crimes across the valley appear to be dropping but
at a far less rate, 3.45%, again showing a reduction in crime rates that cannot be solely
attributed to the police initiative. The time –series shows a reduction in the mean monthly
number of the four calls-for-service from a pre-test mean of 4394.42 calls-for-service per
month to a post-test mean of 4242.67.
An interesting finding by this researcher is the nature of proactivity, self
generated by patrol officers in the field. Documentation provided by the LVMPD is
based on the 400 codes and the call generated by a dispatch center to a patrol officer. The
only data available to analyze the proactive nature is the 467(vehicle stop), and
468(person stop). When officers perform these tactics, the goal is to isolate and identify
possible offenders in the area of concern. The profile nature of such strategies is not the
focus of this paper, only to identify its possible correlations to any findings. Discretionary
and selective authority has been awarded to the field officer in this endeavor, not
requiring evenly dispersed scrutiny. Judgment on the part of the officer is crucial to its
success. As Table 4 depicts, an increase of 12.28% in police proactivity occurred in the
treatment area of SVI. The surrounding areas to the treatment sustained an even larger
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12.78% increase with far fewer crime reduction results than the SVI treatment. This
finding clearly shows that aggressive policing must be accompanied by other elements
that were implemented by the SVI treatment. The study area (Nora) had an increase of
34.64% again showing that as any initiative unfolds, the necessity to compliment with
community support is critical. This is a significant increase in police proactivity with
minimal results to show and justify the man power consumed. The entire rest of the Las
Vegas valley showed an increase of 15.72%. It is clear that police captains in the stations
within the LVMPD are incorporating the aggressive tactics ensued in the initiatives like
SVI, however the results are limited based on the failure to incorporate other elements of
the treatment. However minimal, this could be the resulting variable causing the slight
decrease in Calls-for-Service city wide. That needs to be a question asked in future
research.
Conclusion
Policy implications for the future must include the continuation of community
involvement. It is essential that the mentor component be implemented to increase the
probability of success. This secondary analysis found a 30% reduction in calls-for-service
related to violence which concurs with the findings of Radtke (2007). Many of the
proactive measures were replicated in other areas within the LVMPD jurisdiction with
minimal reductions in violent or property calls-for-service. The variable missing was the
core component of community ownership and neighborhood assistance. Given the
expansion of violent data analyzed with similar findings, it can reasonably be concluded
that the SVI template should be replicated in other jurisdictions with future research
scrutiny. The manner in which SVI incorporated community support along with multiple
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agencies shows significant promise in the fight to reduce calls. This research set out to
look at empirical evidence that showed signs of displacement. Spatial displacement did
appear to occur in the comparison area based on the entire LVMPD jurisdiction showing
a reduction in calls-for-service, whereas, the comparison area showed a minimal increase.
A diffusion of benefits did however occur to surrounding areas to the SVI treatment.
Communities need to help refine these strategies and add upon the successes.
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SVI (W5, W6)
Surrounding (W4, U2, C1, A1, A2, B1)
Comparison (N1, N2)
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